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COSATU, Neo-liberalisation and the Right to Strike1 
 





On 1 January 2019 amendments to the Labour Relations Act came into force that significantly 
altered and curtailed the right to protected strike action in South Africa. Internationally, the right 
to strike has been eroded in recent years with many countries adopting legal provisions that violate 
the International Labour Organization’s principles. Comparatively, the rights of South African 
workers to go on protected strikes remain better than many other places in the world, a reflection 
of the militant history of the South African labour movement. But the erosion of these rights, with 
the active support of the Congress of South African Trade Unions, should be a cause for concern 
for activists and labour scholars in South Africa and beyond. This article develops the Power 
Resources Approach to consider how union institutional power has entrenched neo-liberalism in 
South Africa. Grounding the analysis of institutional power within the analytical framework of 
corporatism allows this article to develop an analysis of institutional power that is attentive to class 
forces. This provides an avenue for understanding the “double-edged sword” of institutional power 
in the South African context in order to comprehend when and under what circumstances trade 
unions advance and defend the interests of the working class and when they defend those of capital.  
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The most historic and progressive changes to South Africa’s labour legislation were adopted 
overwhelmingly by the National Assembly on Tuesday [29 May 2018]. They were the most significant 
and progressive amendments to our labour laws since the end of apartheid and the dawn of our new 
democracy in 1994 (Matthew Parks, Parliamentary Coordinator, Congress of South African Trade 
Unions, 2018). 
 
We believe that the Bills upset the delicate balance that was struck between workers and employers’ 
rights in the Constitution. They represent the most glaring attack on workers since the dawn of 
democracy and are no different to those introduced in Britain by the late Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the United States. Their project, just like these Bills, was designed to 
disarm and emasculate workers (South African Federation of Trade Unions, 2018).  
 
The quotations above represent two very different perspectives on the likely impacts of 
                                                          
1 I would like to thank the anonymous peer reviewers and editors for their detailed and considered 
comments on earlier drafts of this article, which helped to clarify the argument. I’d also like to thank all of 
my comrades at the Simunye Workers Forum who have shaped and refined my understanding of the key 
challenges confronting the labour movement in South Africa today. Particular thanks must go to Ighsaan 
Schroeder for the many conversations that helped to develop the analysis within this article.  
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amendments to the Labour Relations Act (LRA) that were signed into law on 1 January 2019. The 
Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), the largest trade union federation and 
Alliance partner to the African National Congress (ANC), played a significant role in negotiating 
the amendments. In contrast, the South African Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU), a 
breakaway from COSATU, joined other civil society organisations in opposing the Bills that led to 
the legislative amendments, including leading a nationwide strike on 25 April 2018. The differences 
between how the two federations responded to the Bills represent more than just the political 
fallout between SAFTU and COSATU; they illuminate the use of trade union institutional power. 
The Power Resources Approach (PRA) has become one of the dominant conceptual tools in 
contemporary labour studies and has generated significant debates within the Global Labour Journal. 
The focus of this article is to analyse trade union institutional power. Following the critiques made 
by Gallas (2016, 2018), this article argues that the analysis of power resources is often abstracted 
from a wider understanding of class relations and this is particularly the case with the analysis of 
institutional power. Institutional power, this article argues, cannot only be understood as deriving 
from structural and associational power. It must also be understood as a reflection of class forces. 
Furthermore, while scholars often raise the “double-edged” nature of institutional power, few 
scholars advance an analysis that reflects the ends to which this power is put (Nowak, 2018). This 
article intends to address this gap through an analysis of how COSATU has used its institutional 
power to support changes to labour law that have, I argue, entrenched neo-liberalism.  
The article locates the analysis of institutional power within the framework of corporatism in 
order to ground the discussion within an understanding of class forces. Developing this analysis, 
the article then goes on to examine the 1995 LRA as an example of the failure of the corporatist 
framework to deliver “radical reform” in the interests of the working class (Von Holdt 1992). 
Indeed, rather than providing radical reform the 1995 LRA, I argue, set a trajectory that weakened 
trade unions. As Humphrys and Cahill (2017) argue, it is important to not simply understand trade 
unions as “victim[s] of neoliberalising processes”, but also as an active agent making deliberate 
choices and, at times, compromises with neo-liberalism that have undermined the strength of 
organised labour. This article considers that the “crisis of representation” faced by COSATU is not 
simply a product of the reorganisation of work but also one emanating from its own strategic and 
political choices. The crisis facing organised labour provides the context for the recent amendments 
to the LRA. As the article will demonstrate, COSATU alongside the Federation of Unions of South 
Africa (FEDUSA) and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU) made significant 
compromises on the right to strike in order to win concessions from the state and capital that will 
safeguard their own institutional power. The consequences for the labour movement and the 
working class as a whole are likely to be profound.  
 
 
The Double-edged Sword of Institutional Power 
Recent debates on the PRA have been a key part of the scholarship produced within the Global 
Labour Journal. It is not my intention to reproduce all of the debates here but to focus specifically 
on the intended uses of the PRA and the analysis of institutional power. The PRA has been 
explicitly framed around the “revitalisation of trade unions” and has deservedly won praise as a 
tool which labour scholars and activists alike can use to analyse and inform concrete struggles 
(Gallas, 2018). However, as Nowak (2018: 353) contends, the PRA approach has often lacked a 
critical engagement about the “the ends to which those resources could be used”. This is perhaps 
particularly the case with the analysis of institutional power.  
While those who support and defend the PRA recognise that institutional power is a 
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“doubled-edged sword” (Schmalz, Ludwig and Webster, 2018: 121), there is not enough critical 
scholarship as to what this might mean. Furthermore, as Gallas (2016: 270) highlights, institutional 
power has sometimes unhelpfully been equated with workers’ power but “the activities of unions 
are only instances of the exercise of working-class power if they defend, consolidate or improve 
the position of the working class”. It is therefore necessary, as Gallas raises, to consider when and 
under what circumstances trade unions advance and defend the interests of the working class and 
when they advance the interests of capital. 
This has important consequences for the stated aim of the PRA, which is to revitalise trade 
unions. Schmalz, Ludwig and Webster (2019) dismiss the critiques of Gallas and Nowak as 
belonging to the pessimistic tradition of trade union analysis that ultimately regards unions as 
inhibiting revolutionary transformation. However, what Gallas (2018) and Nowak (2018) draw 
attention to is the need for sober analysis of how trade unions have wielded their institutional 
power and to what ends. If, as Humphreys (2018) argues in relation to Australia, trade unions have 
been significant agents in advancing neo-liberalism then we must, at least, pause to reflect on what 
we, as labour scholars and activists, are trying to revitalise.  
I propose to locate an analysis of COSATU’s institutional power within a consideration of the 
function of corporatist relations. The value of this framework is that it provides a way to view how 
relations between the state, capital and labour are structured, something which Schmalz and his 
colleagues highlight as one of the limitations of the PRA (Schmalz et al., 2019: 88). Viewing 
institutional power within a corporatist framework thus provides a more comprehensive analysis 
of the double-edged nature of institutional power and the consequences that have played out for 
the working class in South Africa.  
 
 
Corporatism and Neo-corporatism  
The concepts of corporatism and neo-corporatism originated to analyse the state–capital–labour 
relations that emerged in post-war Western Europe. In this current period of neo-liberal capital, it 
would be appropriate to question whether they continue to have relevance today. Furthermore, it 
would also be apposite to consider what utility they may have in the South African context. In this 
section, I will provide an overview of how the concepts of corporatism and neo-corporatism have 
been defined and suggest why they provide an appropriate conceptual framework for analysis.  
In the first wave of corporatist literature, the predominant focus was on the institutionalised 
structures of interest representation between the state, capital and labour (Bramble and Ollett, 
2007). From the 1970s onwards scholars began to pay more attention to processes of social 
concertation as a form of policy-making, which they referred to as neo-corporatism (Molina and 
Rhodes, 2002). As Baccaro (2003) highlights, the boundaries between these concepts were 
frequently blurred and neo-corporatism was often used to refer to both the institutionalised 
structures of interest and processes of social concertation, with an underlying assumption that the 
appropriate institutionalised structures would promote social concertation.  
An underlying weakness of a significant portion of this literature has been, as Panitch (1981) 
argues, that it failed to consider power relations, especially relations of class power, between the 
state, capital and labour. This neglect of the analysis of power means that, as Bramble and Ollert 
(2007: 571) argue, the ultimate function of corporatism – “to shift material resources and power 
from the working class to the capitalist class” – has been obscured. If the concept of corporatism 
is rooted in an understanding of class relations, as Bramble, Ollert and Panitch have all observed, 
then the distinct features of corporatism, such as social pacts and forms of concertation, are 
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understood as processes through which working-class power is contained and rolled back in favour 
of the capitalist class.  
 
 
Corporatism and the Failure of “Radical Reform” in the 1995 LRA 
At the end of the 1980s in South Africa, the working class had “almost revolutionary potential” 
(Bramble and Ollert, 2007: 586). The independent trade unions that had started in the early 1970s 
evolved into what became COSATU and played a leading role in working-class militancy that 
would eventually bring the National Party to the negotiating table with the ANC. 
COSATU first entered into formal discussions with the then exiled ANC about their 
relationship in 1986; after a series of meetings the federation committed itself to a liberation 
movement “headed by the ANC” (cited in Von Holdt, 1987: 101). Although there were still calls 
for COSATU to form its own independent political organisation, these debates began to close 
from 1987 onwards, paving the way for the formal establishment of the Tripartite Alliance after 
1990 (Beresford, 2016: 11). In the South African context, as Fine (2016) observes, the analysis of 
corporatism cannot be abstracted from an analysis of relations within the Tripartite Alliance 
between the ANC, the South African Communist Party (SACP) and COSATU. Indeed, these 
relations are crucial to understanding the 1995 Labour Relations Act. 
As negotiations for democracy unfolded in the 1990s, corporatism fast became an attractive 
option for the state, capital and labour (Kim and Van der Westhuizen, 2018). Indeed, despite the 
obvious political, social and economic differences between South Africa at the end of the 1980s 
and Western Europe in the 1970s both were confronted with the issue of how to contain working-
class militancy in the face of economic crisis (Bramble and Ollert, 2007). The foundations for South 
Africa’s future corporatist framework were laid with the Laboria Minute of 1990, an agreement 
which stated that any future amendments of the LRA would be done in consultation with 
COSATU and other relevant parties. Habib (1997) identifies this as the moment at which the trade 
union began to be drawn into corporatist processes. However, this was not without extensive 
debate within the labour movement itself. There were those who argued that corporatist relations 
would weaken and co-opt the movement (Callincos, 1992; Desai and Habib, 1994), while others 
argued that it could create “strategic unionism” in support of “radical reforms” (Von Holdt, 1992: 
33).  
The redrafting of the LRA provided the first opportunity to use COSATU’s position within 
the corporatist framework to push for radical reform. The LRA now had to provide a legislative 
framework in which the constitutional rights to fair labour practice, to form and join trade unions, 
to bargain collectively and to strike could be enacted. The fact that none of these rights had been 
guaranteed before, especially for black workers, was of course a significant step forward. However, 
the LRA also sought to develop an explicitly neo-liberal concern for “regulated flexibility” (Du 
Toit et al., 2003). As the Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied the Bill explained, the 
purpose of the new LRA was in line with the goals of the Reconstruction and Development 
Programme (RDP) and “seeks to balance the demands of international competitiveness and the 
protection of fundamental rights of workers…. the draft Bill seeks to avoid the imposition of 
rigidities in the labour market” (Ministerial Task Team, 1995: 285–286). To achieve this the new 
LRA established new procedures for protected strike action, provided a voluntary framework for 
collective bargaining and established the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration 
(CCMA) to handle dispute resolution (Du Toit et al., 2003). However, the final LRA fell short of 
COSATU’s demands. 
COSATU demanded the legal duty to bargain, which had been possible under the 1956 LRA, 
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that replacement labour during strikes be banned and the right to strike over dismissals and 
retrenchments, which the 1995 LRA restricted (Schroeder, 2002). Rejecting key provisions in the 
new LRA, COSATU took to the streets, with an estimated 70 000 workers marching in June 1995. 
In a clever performance of Alliance politics, President Nelson Mandela joined the march but none 
of COSATU’s demands were won (The Citizen, 1995: 4). As Schroeder (2002) highlights, the 1995 
LRA contained necessary compromises to dismantle the apartheid labour regime. However, rather 
than present the legislation as a product of these necessary compromises COSATU (1995: n.p.) 
celebrated the new LRA as a “quantum leap for workers … [and] a victory for workers” and 
refrained from continuing to campaign on any of these key demands. 
A further problem with the 1995 LRA, which was little discussed at the time, was that it 
entrenched an insidious loophole regarding the employment relations of temporary employment 
services (TES) workers. Writing in 1999, Adler and Webster celebrated that the new LRA had, for 
the first time, brought all workers under one industrial relations system, but this was not entirely 
accurate. Curiously, the drafters of the LRA chose to define the employment relationship of 
workers employed by temporary employment services, more commonly known in South Africa as 
labour broker workers, in line with amendments introduced in the 1983 LRA, which stated that 
workers were “deemed” to be employees of their employer (the TES) and not the client (the 
company that hires the labour broker to provide workers). As Theron (2005) highlights, the only 
change that the drafters of the 1995 LRA made was to remove the word “deemed”, thus continuing 
a legal mechanism instituted by the apartheid regime in order to control African migrant labour on 
fixed and temporary contracts. The consequences of this are well documented (Theron, 2005; 
Dickinson, 2017a, 2017b). Labour broker workers were effectively not afforded the right to strike 
or protection against unfair dismissal, as the client is not considered to be the employer.2 As Theron 
(2005) documents, after 1995 the number of workers employed through TES increased 
dramatically, and this has played a significant role in the restructuring of the working class. 
 
 
A “Crisis of Representation” 
The global restructuring of work has played a significant role in re-shaping working-class life and 
the composition of trade union membership in South Africa, as it has elsewhere in the world. The 
latest COSATU survey demonstrates that 90 per cent of its membership is comprised of permanent 
workers, with two-thirds of those members engaged in skilled or supervisory work (Bischoff and 
Tame, 2017: 66). The traditional blue-collar worker that was historically the base of COSATU has 
declined in significance, and very few atypical workers are organised in COSATU leading to what 
Webster (2006) describes as a “crisis of representation”. However, COSATU’s role within this 
crisis is seldom analysed.  
COSATU recognised as early as 1997 the need to organise atypical workers. The September 
Commission (1997) outlined the particular kinds of workers that COSATU should look to organise: 
vulnerable sectors (defined as construction, farming, parts of retail, and catering and domestic 
work); vulnerable layers in organised sectors (specifically sub-contracted, outsourced, casualised, 
contract and part-time workers); the informal sector; immigrant workers; women workers; and 
skilled and white-collar workers. Reflecting on the challenges raised by flexible labour and the 
informal sector, COSATU outlined two scenarios: “continue with no change” or “commit 
resources to organising vulnerable layers” (September Commission, 1997). In the first scenario, 
                                                          
2 This has subsequently changed due to amendments made to section 198 in 2014 (Runciman and Webster, 
2017).  
 




COSATU affiliates would fail to organise or defend the growing layers of ‘flexible’ workers. As sub-
contracting, casualising, labour-brokering become more common, they will undermine the unions’ 
bargaining position, weakening the unions and undermining labour standards. COSATU would find 
it medals [sic] [struggles] to contest the labour market trends towards ‘flexibility’. Ultimately, 
COSATU could end up being based in a shrinking section of the working class, as has happened to 
trade unions in a number of other countries (September Commission, 1997: n.p.). 
 
However, when it comes to the recommendations made by the September Commission the 
focus on the “vulnerable layers” gets subsumed under a focus of organising skilled and white-collar 
workers. Indeed, in Chapter 7 of the September Commission, which focuses on organising new 
sectors, fifty-eight references are made to white-collar work or workers, compared to eleven 
mentions of non-standard work/employment and five mentions of vulnerable layers. 
Furthermore, the recommendations that are made are disconnected from the realities faced 
by sub-contacted, outsourced and casualised workers. Many proposals remain at an abstract level 
– for example, “each affiliate needs to develop focussed campaigns to organise and defend these 
workers” (September Commission, 1997: n.p.). Others recommendations reveal the distance that 
already existed between precarious workers and COSATU. For instance, they recommend that the 
interests of vulnerable workers be included in collective bargaining (September Commission, 1997: 
n.p.) without being alive to the challenges of this or how it might be in conflict with the interests 
of the skilled and white-collar workers they also seek to organise. Nevertheless, the document does 
recognise that union officials and shop stewards do not take the problems of non-standard workers 
seriously. Some proposals that may have helped – such as developing flexible policies on union 
subs including lower rates, allowing periods of unpaid membership and demanding that employers 
pay union subscriptions – were never implemented. 
It took over a decade for COSATU to begin to take up any campaigning around labour 
broking, calling for a ban in 2006. However, as Theron argues, 
 
…the call to ban labour broking was made at least ten years too late. It was also a naïve demand. It 
focused attention on only one way in which employment has been externalised. It was also not a 
demand labour could win, given the global context … [and] coupled with the fact that South Africa 
is a constitutional state. Even if it had been possible to implement a ban, labour brokers would in all 
likelihood have been able to reinvent themselves as ‘services’, as some have already done, and carry 
out the same activity under another guise (Theron, 2014: 9).  
 
While the demand may have been naïve, COSATU was able to use its political relationship to 
the ANC to press for changes in the legislation. Shortly after President Zuma came to power, 
thanks in part to COSATU’s backing (Ceruti, 2008), public hearings on labour broking were held 
that would eventually lead to significant new rights for labour broker workers (Runciman and 
Webster, 2017.  
While COSATU may have been pivotal in initiating the process it was, however, not an active 
participant within it. COSATU leaders in the National Economic Development and Labour 
Council (NEDLAC) refused to take part in discussions, leaving it up to the state and capital as to 
how to amend the legislation. Furthermore, since the legislation came into effect, trade unions have 
not taken up any significant campaigning around the new rights; analysis I have made of the CCMA 
caseload demonstrates that a significant proportion of cases have been brought by advice offices, 
particularly the Casual Workers Advice Office (CWAO). 
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The “crisis of representation” that confronts COSATU and other trade unions in South Africa 
cannot simply be attributed to neo-liberal restructuring without union involvement. As I have 
argued here, COSATU followed a particular strategy to organise the middle-class workers that now 
dominate its membership. While it utilised its institutional power, mediated through its political 
relationship to the ANC, to initiate a process of reform around the rights of TES workers it has 
largely been absent from shaping the content of these rights or their implementation. This, in turn, 
has weakened COSATU’s associational power as it represents a shrinking section of the working 
class. This has not only created a crisis of representation but also a crisis of legitimacy for COSATU. 
 
 
A Crisis of Legitimacy: The Context of the 2019 LRA Amendments 
Arguably, the 2019 LRA amendments cannot be understood outside the context of the events at 
Marikana in 2012. Marikana encapsulated the crisis of legitimacy faced by the trade union 
movement both in the eyes of workers and of capital. The strikes across the platinum belt in 2012 
were significant for the way in which they were organised through independent worker committees. 
Not only were the strikes independent of unions, in most instances they included members of 
multiple unions. Feeling that well-established unions – the COSATU-affiliated National Union of 
Mineworkers (NUM) in particular – were not carrying forward their demands, workers took it upon 
themselves to demand higher wages from their employers. As Buhlungu (2016: 145) argues, by 
breaking away from the NUM workers were “breaking away from the political monopoly” between 
COSATU, the ANC and capital. They were met with heavy state repression, resulting in the 
massacre of thirty-four striking mineworkers on 16 August 2012 (Sinwell and Mbatha, 2016). 
The strike wave that followed the Marikana massacre – including work stoppages in the car 
industry, at various power stations and by City Power workers in Johannesburg, a truckers’ strike 
and a farmworkers’ strike – demonstrated that workers would no longer be restrained by their trade 
unions and that non-unionised workers such as farmworkers were beginning to organise more and 
more (Paret and Runciman, 2016). COSATU’s failure to keep the working class quiescent 




The Justification for Amending the LRA 
The impact assessment that accompanies the 2017 LRA Amendment Bill argues that strikes have 
been increasingly prevalent, prolonged and violent. This is a view that has entered common-sense 
knowledge about strikes and has even influenced how scholars have written about contemporary 
strike action in South Africa (Cheadle et al., 2017; Webster, 2017). However, these arguments are 
often based on a poor and selective interpretation of the available data. In fact, the data suggests 
that there is nothing particularly remarkable about strike trends in South Africa.  
The Department of Labour motivates that strike action is increasing because the number of 
work stoppages is increasing, which is indeed the case (see Figure 1). But this is an imprecise 
measure of industrial action because of the vastly different lengths of time a work stoppage can 
take. Usually, it is the number of working days lost that is used as a barometer of industrial action. 
Figure 2 presents the number of working days lost between 2006 and 2017. While there are peaks 
in 2007, 2010 and 2014, reflecting the 2007 and 2010 public sector strikes and the 2014 platinum 
strike, overall the trend in the number of working days lost over the last decade is declining. 
Furthermore, as Bhorat and Tseng (2014) demonstrate, South Africa’s depth of strike activity (the 
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number of working days lost per strikers’ working days per annum) and strikers’ intensity (the 
number of strikers per 1 000 employed workers) is comparable or, indeed, lower than middle-
income and even high-income countries. The evidence therefore suggests that South Africa’s levels 





Source: Department of Labour Annual Industrial Action Reports (1999 to 2016) 
 





Source: Department of Labour Annual Industrial Action Reports (2006 to 2017) 
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Another concern of the amendments has been to address strike violence. It is certainly the 
case that South Africa has witnessed violent strikes. However, there has been little attempt to 
actually quantify the levels of strike violence. Analysts have tended to focus on individual cases 
such as the 2006 private security sector strike (Webster, 2017), the 2007 public sector strike (Von 
Holdt, 2013) or the 2012 strikes in the platinum sector (Chinguno, 2015). The impact assessment 
that accompanies the Bill uses a report by the South African Institute for Race Relations on deaths 
during strikes to substantiate the argument that strike violence is increasing. While I do not want 
to diminish the significance of any violence during a strike, it is problematic to use such extreme 
cases to generalise to all strike action, especially when there is robust quantitative evidence on the 
number of instances of violence during labour protests. 
Working with data from the South African Police Service’s (SAPS) Incident Registration 
Information System (IRIS), I have been part of a team of researchers at the Centre for Social 
Change, University of Johannesburg, which has demonstrated that the vast majority of labour 
protests between 1997 and 2013, 88 per cent, were orderly in nature. Although from 2010 onwards 
there is a small increase in the number of disorderly incidents (see Figure 3), it can still be said that 
the vast majority of South Africa’s labour protests are orderly in nature. While we do not have 
access to more recent data, there is no reason to think these trends will have altered dramatically.  
 
 
Source: Runciman et al. (2016) 
 
Figure 3. Estimated number of orderly and disorderly labour protests, 1997–2013 
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The analysis above underlines that the rationale for the LRA amendments was not made on 
the basis of robust evidence but rather the marshalling of facts that helped to support a particular 
ideological argument about the nature of contemporary strike action in South Africa. Indeed, I 
argue that the true intentions of the 2019 LRA amendments are not aimed simply at reducing 
violent strike action but at reducing the incidence of strikes in general. 
  
 
Restricting the Right to Strike: The Impact of the 2019 LRA Amendments 
In order to substantiate the argument that the 2019 LRA amendments are designed to restrict all 
strike action, it is necessary to outline what the changes to the LRA will mean. Table 1 provides a 
summary of the amendments that relate to strike action. This section explains the potential 
consequences of these amendments and why they are likely to restrict the ability of trade union 
members to embark on procedural strike action. 
 
 
Table 1. Summary of 2019 LRA amendments 
Section of the LRA Proposed amendment 
69 Picketing rules have to be agreed before a certificate of non-resolution 
of a mutual interest dispute is issued  
95 Compulsory for registered trade unions to include provisions within its 
constitution before embarking on strike action 
135 Extension of conciliation from 30 to 35 days 
150 Changes to advisory arbitration 
 
 
When a trade union intends to take strike action, it refers a dispute of mutual interest to 
the CCMA or to the relevant bargaining council. A commissioner then attempts to mediate 
between the employers and the trade union to resolve the dispute at conciliation. If the 
commissioner is unable to resolve the dispute at conciliation a certificate of non-resolution is 
issued, commonly referred to as a strike certificate. After it has been issued the trade union must 
give the employer forty-eight hours’ notice of any strike action. The conciliation process has now 
been extended to thirty-five days. While this may seem a relatively minor change, the impact of this 
amendment is that it gives the employers more time to prepare for strike action through stockpiling 
and the employment of alternative labour. This is further exacerbated by the introduction of 
compulsory picketing rules.  
Previously, it was not a legal requirement that picketing rules be agreed before the certificate 
of non-resolution was issued. Now they have to be agreed prior to the certificate being issued. If 
the parties are unable to agree the picketing rules then the commissioner will have the power to 
determine what they are. The default picketing rules further reveal the extent to which the right to 
strike is under attack. While the default rules are intended to be used when workers, unions and 
employers are unable to mutually agree, the concern is that these regulations will become the norm 
and impose severe limitations on all strikes. 
The default picketing rules require a statement of when and where a picket will take place. In 
addition, pickets will be limited to a maximum number of workers. Members of the public will be 
banned from showing solidarity with striking workers as pickets will be limited to striking workers 
and union members only. The default rules also provide commissioners with far-ranging powers 
to decide what workers can and cannot do on a picket. For example, they will be able to decide 
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what songs can be sung, whether placards can be held, whether workers can be addressed by a 
union official and whether workers can speak to members of the public about their strike. 
Commissioners will not be required to justify any limitations they place on the activities of striking 
workers. This may not only undermine the right to strike, but also the right to freedom of 
expression. If any of the picketing rules are broken the trade union will be required to suspend the 
picket until it has satisfied a commissioner that it can control the picket. This opens up trade unions 
to having to suspend their picket for the slightest reason and fundamentally undermines the 
collective power of a strike. The default picketing rules entirely favour employers, who will know 
even before a certificate of non-resolution is awarded when and where the strike will take place, as 
it must be stated in the picketing rules. This provides employers ample time to stockpile, hire 
alternative labour and undertake other action to undermine workers’ collective power (Runciman, 
2018a). 
The amendments also introduce a further change by requiring registered trade unions to 
include in their constitutions secret ballot provisions prior to strike action. The possibility of secret 
strike ballots had actually been introduced in a tabled amendment to the LRA in 2012. At that time 
COSATU vehemently opposed this, arguing: 
 
It should be noted that balloting requirements were a distinct feature of the apartheid legislative 
regime. Its absence in the current LRA was no oversight but rather an acknowledgement of the 
extensive abuse of technicalities by employers around balloting to prevent industrial action. Its 
reintroduction reflects a fundamental attack not only on the right to strike but also on collective 
bargaining (COSATU, 2012: 11). 
 
However, in 2018 COSATU, FEDUSA and NACTU presented the introduction of secret 
strike ballots as a minor alteration to the strike balloting procedures that registered trade unions 
were already required to have within their constitutions. They argue,  
 
Unions and employers’ organisations have been required for the past 23 years to have the mandatory 
requirement to ballot their members when they want to strike. The sole change to the balloting 
provisions in this bill is to insert the word secret before ballot. The majority of unions, political parties 
and other organisations elect their leadership through secret ballots… This insertion is a simply [sic] 
clarification as to what a ballot constitutes. It is in line with common law, practise [sic] and the 
Constitution. Organised labour is comfortable that it has protected workers’ hard-won constitutional 
rights to strike (COSATU, FEDUSA and NACTU, 2018: 20–21).  
 
The position of the three federations is that making strike ballots secret is only a clarification 
of existing practice, but I think this is a disingenuous claim. Previously, unions were free to 
implement strike ballots in line with the direct and participatory forms of democracy that have 
been integral to the trade union movement in South Africa (Desai, 2016). By imposing a secret 
ballot these traditions will be overridden. As the CWAO (2018: 7) argues, the secret ballot 
“undermine[s] the essential collective decision making of a strike…. It not only individualises an 
otherwise collective decision but more fundamentally it wrests from the control of workers their 
ability to choose their own democratic processes and procedures”. The amendments to the LRA 
do not permit employers to interdict strikes on the basis of technicalities around the ballot. 
However, as the experience of the CWAO demonstrates, the Labour Court has been increasingly 
willing to grant interim strike interdicts to employers even when they fail to meet the minimum 
evidentiary requirements (Schroeder and Wesso, 2018).  
Finally, even if workers and unions comply with all of the new procedures outlined above, 
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employers still have one final way in which they can frustrate strike action. New procedures around 
advisory arbitration mean that strikes may be resolved through an advisory arbitration panel led by 
a senior commissioner of the CCMA. An advisory arbitration panel can be established if the 
Minister of Labour or the Director of the CCMA deem it to be in the “public interest” or if it is 
requested by any party to the dispute. The amendment sets out criteria for “public interest” that 
are so wide that almost any strike could be subjected to advisory arbitration. Furthermore, 
employers will have the right to request advisory arbitration, which will obviously be in their 
interests to do as soon as a certificate of non-resolution is issued and even before the strike has 
started. While the process of advisory arbitration does not suspend the strike, it draws union 
officials into highly technical procedures. Furthermore, the ruling by the arbitration panel is binding 
unless rejected by the trade union within seven days, after consulting with their members 
(Runciman, 2018b).  
Viewing the amendments together, it is clear that the intention of the legislation is not to 
simply reduce violent strikes. Indeed, if that had been the case the amendments should have 
considered regulating the use of alternative labour during strikes, one of the most common causes 
of conflict. Instead these amendments are aimed at restricting procedural strikes in general. The 
impact of this may simply be to increase the number of unprocedural strikes (see Runciman, 2018c). 
If we are to understand why COSATU championed these amendments then we must analyse what 
they gained from them.  
 
 
Strengthening Trade Union Institutional Power through Legal Reform  
It is no accident that the LRA amendments were tabled at the same time as the National Minimum 
Wage (NMW) Bill. For both COSATU and the ANC the introduction of the NMW was an 
important attempt to restore the legitimacy of both organisations while drawing a strategic focus 
away from the LRA amendments. Indeed SAFTU, in its campaigning against the Bills, frequently 
focused on the NMW and neglected to focus on the LRA amendments (Dor, 2018).  
A significant but overlooked aspect of the LRA amendments was that they protect the status 
of trade unions within bargaining councils. Declining trade union membership has impacted the 
ability of trade unions to act as representatives within bargaining councils. Previously, employer 
organisations had to employ the majority of employees and unions had to represent the majority 
of employees in order for collective agreements to be extended to non-union members. Now, the 
Minister of Labour can extend collective agreements to non-parties as long as the employer 
organisations employ the majority of employees even when a union does not organise the majority 
of the workers. This only serves to bolster the power of unions within sectors that have bargaining 
councils, and allows greater scope for new bargaining councils to be established. 
It could be argued that amending the basis upon which representivity is calculated will 
strengthen collective bargaining and afford workers greater protections. However, analysis of 
bargaining council agreements by Bassier (2018) has highlighted that as many as 80 per cent of 
bargaining council agreements allow for downward variation from the Basic Conditions of 
Employment Act (BCEA) – that is the legislation that is intended to be the minimum floor of labour 
rights. Therefore, rather than extend worker rights bargaining council agreements have been 
undermining them. 
Furthermore, rather than acting as an incentive to organise non-standard workers, COSATU 
has previously argued against their inclusion in how the number of employees is calculated for 
representivity (COSATU, 2012). While the wording of the amendment does not mean that the 
Registrar or the Minister must exclude non-standard employees there is every possibility that 
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COSATU will lean on its political relationship to the ANC and state machinery to ensure that non-
standard employees are excluded. For the CWAO this amendment represents  
 
…nothing more than a cynical move by trade unions to safeguard their waning influence. Instead of 
addressing their declining membership by organising new workers, the trade union federations are 
exchanging hard-won workers’ rights, for which they have no mandate from the majority of workers, 
for the protection of Bargaining Councils (CWAO, 2018: 9). 
 
An analysis of the 2019 LRA amendments raises serious concerns about the ends to which 




The analysis presented in this article offers a challenge for the use of the PRA and the analysis of 
institutional power. By situating institutional power within an analysis of corporatism, I argue that 
institutional power develops further analytical utility, which is attentive to class forces. In addition 
to this, in the specificities of the South African context, corporatism also provides an avenue for 
understanding how the specific forms of institutional power that have been forged by COSATU 
are related to their political relationship to the ANC, thus providing a more comprehensive account 
of how institutional power has been shaped. 
The article not only considers what gives rise to institutional power but also how it has been 
strategically used. Understanding this requires a wider consideration of COSATU’s associational 
and structural power as well as its waning political influence. By analysing the 1995 LRA and the 
2019 amendments this article is able to give some consideration as to how COSATU’s institutional 
power has unfolded through time. Rather than viewing the 1995 LRA as an unqualified victory, as 
is commonly the case within the literature (Adler and Webster, 1999), this article highlights how 
significant compromises within the 1995 LRA entrenched neo-liberalism in South Africa, the 
unintended consequences of which have served to undermine the power of trade unions and the 
working class overall.  
The analysis presented within this article demonstrates how neo-liberal restructuring in South 
Africa emerged hand-in-hand with corporatism. The 1995 LRA was the first and one of the most 
significant pieces of legislation to be enacted by the first democratic government. While it was 
undoubtedly a significant step forward for South African workers, particularly black South African 
workers, it also set out an explicitly neo-liberal path focused on “regulated flexibility” (Du Toit et 
al., 2003), an objective of both corporatism and neo-liberalism (Humphrys, 2018).  While it could 
be argued that the compromises of the 1995 LRA were necessary in order to formally end the 
apartheid labour regime, this does not mean we should negate an understanding of COSATU’s 
agency in resisting the forces of neo-liberalism.  
As this article argues, COSATU made strategic choices about whom to organise, and in doing 
so chose to neglect some of the most vulnerable sections of the South African labour market. In 
the absence of organised labour, the number of precarious workers has grown considerably. While 
COSATU did utilise its institutional power to initiate reforms to the LRA to enhance protections 
for vulnerable workers, this has translated into little concrete organising of these workers. Indeed, 
if anything, the 2019 amendments illustrate that COSATU is willing to act against the interests of 
these workers in order to shore up its own structural, associational and institutional power.   
Compared to the negotiations on the 1995 LRA, COSATU was in a much weaker position 
when it came to the negotiations on the amendments to the LRA that began in 2014. This may 
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raise questions about the contemporary nature of corporatism, especially when there is a general 
consensus that NEDLAC has generally failed to be an effective institution (Kim and Van der 
Westhuizen, 2018). However, the 2019 LRA amendments provide a case in which corporatist 
structures were revived in the service of advancing neo-liberalism. Furthermore, it demonstrates 
how the incorporation of COSATU into a neo-liberal corporatist project saw it use its institutional 
power against the interests of the working class in the defence of capital. While South Africa’s new 
strike laws may still be considered as more progressive than elsewhere in the world (Hepple, Le 
Roux and Sciarra, 2015), the amendments do represent a significant rolling back of the right to 
strike – a right that was fought for in the struggle against apartheid. In the context of South Africa, 
one of the most unequal countries in the world, the rolling back of the right to strike will have 
significant implications for the working class and for inequality.  
The analysis presented in this article supports the critique of the PRA advanced by Nowak 
(2018) – that as serious labour scholars we cannot analyse power resources without seriously 
considering to what ends those resources are used, especially if they are used against the interests 
of the working class. In the South African case, serious questions have to be asked about the current 
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